ISAS Briefs

Summary

India continues to pursue a tight-rope strategy in the Indian Ocean, aimed at countering China’s rising influence in the region but avoiding serious escalation. At the same time, it wants to signal to the region that despite its sometimes-cautious approach, it is a major maritime power.

During his visit to the Maldives on 25 and 26 July 2025, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi once again touted MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) as his new maritime policy. First announced in March 2025, it is presented as a major evolution from India’s previous SAGAR doctrine. MAHASAGAR arrives at a time when New Delhi appears to have suffered a series of setbacks in its contest with China for influence over the neighbourhood, most notably in Bangladesh.

Four months after its launch, MAHASAGAR remains light on details. It promises deepening of India’s commitment to the Global South through technology transfer, trade expansion, grant assistance and security cooperation but does not mention any specific initiatives. Its geographical scope remains unclear – earlier this month, Modi invoked it in Trinidad and Tobago, a Caribbean nation far away from the Indian Ocean. It remains nebulous enough that the Indian Ministry of External Affairs is yet to decide whether it is a vision, doctrine or initiative.

MAHASAGAR’s broad and vague articulation is not a bug but a feature of Indian strategy. It reinforces India’s image as a major power in the Indian Ocean without committing it to any fundamental policy overhaul. Such sweeping but non-committal declarations help New Delhi pursue its two countervailing goals: signalling to the littorals that it will balance against growing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean while ensuring that Sino-Indian rivalry does not spiral out of control. As before, New Delhi is likely to continue its gradual maritime expansion, piecemeal initiatives and deals.

Since the 1980s, Indian geostrategic footprint in the Indian Ocean has been steadily expanding as a natural outgrowth of its rising military and economic power. However, in the last decade or so, growing Chinese presence in the ocean has forced New Delhi to develop a deliberate strategic response.

An uptick in the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) deployment to the region, along with its acquisition of a naval base in Djibouti and naval cooperation with Pakistan, has understandably made India uncomfortable. However, commentators tend to overstate the threat posed by Chinese naval presence in the ocean. They often overread the geostrategic significance of Chinese commercial ventures in littoral countries, and underestimate the vulnerabilities of the extended supply lines PLAN faces while operating in the Indian Ocean. India enjoys enormous geographic advantage as the centre of the ocean, and the United States (US) Navy remains a formidable presence with its string of bases in East Africa, Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia, Australia and Diego Garcia. China would require considerable resources and time to meaningfully alter the balance of power in the Indian Ocean. Whether it would be worthwhile for Beijing to mount such an effort is not altogether clear.

A more immediate challenge for India is Beijing’s rising political influence in the neighbouring littoral states, where New Delhi has historically enjoyed great sway, such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles. India feels that often the Chinese influence comes at its cost. A parallel concern is that these states may exploit the Sino-Indian competition to extract more sops from both sides.

While seeing off the Chinese challenge, New Delhi also wishes to avert major escalation of the maritime rivalry. Its geostrategic focus continues to be fastened to its northern borders. The 2020 Galwan Valley clashes and 2025 India-Pakistan conflict have ensured that this will be the case for the foreseeable future. New Delhi would prefer to avoid a costly arms race in the Indian Ocean. Indeed, the Indian Navy remains the least-resourced of its armed forces.

Due to these imperatives, India has shied away from two possible response strategies: neutralisation or American alliance. Although confidence-building measures, arms limitation treaty or Sino-Indian maritime détente would ease the pressure on the rivalry, neutralisation would give China greater room to consolidate its influence in the littorals through economic penetration. On the other hand, while a closer maritime partnership with the US would strengthen Indian position in the region, it would escalate the maritime rivalry with China. In any case, New Delhi also harbours misgivings about American strategy in the Indian Ocean. Accordingly, it has stopped short of fully embracing the US.

Moreover, its going-it-alone strategy appears affordable so far. With the oceanic balance of power in its favour and deep historical ties with the neighbouring littorals, it feels it can be measured in its response. Rather than reacting to every setback, it can be patient and selective in the offsetting steps it takes.

The Maldives is case in point. When Malé moved closer to China and provoked a diplomatic row with India last year, New Delhi’s official response was remarkably muted. Economic pressures forced the Maldives to quickly make a turnaround and repair the relationship, culminating in Modi’s visit last week.

At the same time, New Delhi needs to ensure that its circumspection is not perceived by the littoral countries as conceding to Beijing’s rising power. It has postured as a major maritime power in the Indian Ocean through a grab-bag of declarations, maritime multilateralism, naval diplomacy and security dialogues. While many of these moves do not result in material outcomes, they implicitly signal India’s intent to remain a major counterweight to China in the region.

Although vague as of now, MAHASAGAR is yet another reminder to the littoral states that New Delhi has a major role to play in Indian Ocean in the long run. Admittedly, it still needs to figure out what that role may be.

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Dr Sandeep Bhardwaj is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). He can be contacted at sbhardwaj@nus.edu.sg. The author bears full responsibility for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper.

Pic Credit: Wikimedia Commons