ISAS Briefs

Summary

This brief offers a deeper analysis of the recent meeting between India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and China’s President Xi Jinping. It argues that disproportionate attention has been paid to its implications for the United States-China-India triangle, while four critical aspects have been largely overlooked.

The meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) leaders’ summit in Tianjin between 31 August and 1 September 2025 represented a symbolic milestone in the improvement of China-India relations. The meeting has been extensively covered and analysed but poorly understood. This is due to it being seen through the prism of larger geopolitics, especially the supposed emergence of a ‘post-American’ international order and the current crisis in the relations between the United States (US) and India. While valuable in its own right, this framing overlooks the continued difficulties in China-India relations and the difficult but successful process of improving them before US President Donald Trump’s actions accelerated the process.

Much has been written about the meeting but four points – fundamentally important for the development of China-India relations – have not attracted sufficient attention.

First, the most important point is that the meeting took place during a Modi visit to China. The symbolic meaning of the meeting during such a visit after seven years far outweighs the lack of immediate deliverables, which some commentators have noted. The visit means that the slow and painful thaw, which started in October 2024 and aimed at defrosting relations after five years of post-2020 freeze, is complete and the two sides can move to more active engagement.

There are, of course, no agreements and other deliverables announced during the meeting, which has inevitably dampened expectations of a fast takeoff in relations. However, the meeting built on the agreements reached after months of negotiations and announced during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent visit to India. Hence, it was the deliverables that produced the Modi-Xi meeting and not the other way round.

Second, the ‘strategic autonomy’ language in which India couched the meeting is significant. It not only sends a message to Washington that New Delhi cannot be pressured to change its foreign policy but also reassures Beijing that India does not seek anti-Chinese alignment with the US. Crucially, the Indian readout of the meetings also emphasised that relations should not be seen through a ‘third country lens’. This signifies an attempt to develop China-India relations with less focus on the US angle in the US-China-India triangle. Probably, this is born out of the realisation that this US focus has greatly complicated relations with Beijing in recent years, especially since the 2020 border crisis.

However, de-emphasising Washington in China-India relations is easier said than done. New Delhi seems to be using its better relations with Beijing to gain leverage on Washington, while China celebrates Modi’s visit as a major win over the US.

Third, the emphasis on promoting multipolarity is significant, particularly in the context of a SCO summit that has seen ambitious plans to develop the organisation. It suggests greater emphasis on cooperation and even some convergence of views between the two sides in institutions like the BRICS and the SCO. Of course, it also sends a message to the US. Additionally, the emphasis on multipolarity suggests that the two sides will focus more on the global part of their relationship – the part that is focused on transforming the international system and international institutions to reflect the interests and views of the non-Western world. It also opens the door for trilateral cooperation with Russia – the other great power promoting multipolarity. This global part of the China-India relationship has been historically one of its most constructive components and has proven much less contentious than the bilateral and regional parts of it.

Interestingly, the Chinese side spoke about global multipolarity, while the Indian emphasised both global and Asian multipolarity. The nuance has significant implications and suggests continued Indian concerns about potential Chinese preeminence in Asia.

Finally, there are still some differences on the role the disputed border plays in the China-India relationship. The Chinese readout of the meeting states that the border should not disrupt bilateral relations but the Indian one points to Modi underlining “…the importance of peace and tranquility on the border areas for continued development of bilateral relations.” This does not reverse the recent compartmentalisation of the border issue from the rest of the relationship which was embodied in the recent agreement to create three new mechanisms to manage the border and advance negotiations on it. However, it shows that the compartmentalisation is not complete. It also demonstrates that India’s concerns about the stabilisation of the disputed border persist.

In conclusion, the Modi-Xi meeting was very important and highly productive but poorly understood. The flood of commentaries and the inevitable politicisation surrounding the meeting have overshadowed some of its critical aspects that will shape the future of China-India relations. The Elephant and the Dragon have not started to tango yet – to borrow a favourite Chinese phrase often used in commentaries – but they have agreed to dance together and are preparing their moves.

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Dr Ivan Lidarev is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). He can be contacted at ivanlidarev@nus.edu.sg. The author bears full responsibility for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper.

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