ISAS Working Papers

Afghanistan’s failure to stabilise continues to trouble Afghans and non-Afghans alike, since the consequences of earlier efforts led to unimaginable consequences. Researchers of many conflict-ridden societies cite the failure to govern as being ‘one of the main reasons for the spread of alienation, militancy and insurgency’, and identify the failure to govern to include the failure to provide basic facilities. This paper takes a look at the structure of the government that has emerged in post-Taliban Afghanistan, specifically whether its essential feature, a strong unitary state rooted in an executive presidency and a weak legislature with its unique electoral system, is conducive to establishing peace, stability and inclusive governance in the country. This would be examined with reference to the state- and nation-building experiences of modern Afghanistan, defined as the state which emerged after the second Afghan War (1878-1880), and the effect of the prolonged conflict over the past three decades. The impact of foreign interference, a lot of which has been direct [Russian invasion, Pakistani support for the Mujahideen in the 1980s and the creation of the Taliban later, United Nations’ (UN)-sanctioned United States (US)-led effort that overthrew the Taliban and continuing today] and the Afghan reactions to these interferences has had a major impact on the internal dynamics of governance as well as on the credibility of the state, not easily captured in formal structures.3