ISAS Insights

The leaderships of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) countries were pushed by domestic considerations to lay out a programme for withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan at a more accelerated pace than they had originally envisaged. There were both political and financial reasons for America’s rush to the door. The war was no longer regarded by the citizens as “necessary”. This change in sentiment could not be ignored by the country’s leadership especially when President Barack Obama faced stiff opposition in the run-up to the November 2012 presidential contest. America’s European allies were even less enthusiastic about the war. They were too engrossed in solving their growing economic problems to focus much attention on a difficult and distant land. And the cost of continued engagement was way beyond what America and Europe could afford. President Obama told the press after the conclusion of the NATO summit in Chicago, held on 20-21 May 2012, “We can pull our troops back in a responsible way and we can start rebuilding America and start making some of the massive investments.... in America here at home.”2 But such a neat outcome does not seem to be on the cards even after the NATO summit in Chicago. This paper suggests that the “great pullout” is likely to be a messy affair and not as desired by the United States and its allies. Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States will remain engaged in one way or other in Afghanistan for years to come. Its pullout will not be as complete as was that of the Soviets.