ISAS Briefs

Summary

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India in early December 2025 – his first after his 2022 invasion of Ukraine – not only saw the reaffirmation of the strategic partnership between the two countries but also the elevation of the under-performing economic dimension of the relationship. Amid the unprecedented strain on Russia’s ties with the West and its impact on New Delhi’s ties with the United States and Europe, India has signalled its strong support for the peace process in Ukraine.

President Vladimir Putin’s trip to New Delhi on 4 and 5 December 2025 – the first in four years – lasted barely 24 hours but it helped restructure the relationship by looking beyond the traditional preoccupation with defence and oil trade. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s decision to personally receive Putin at the airport signalled India’s determination to sustain the special ties with Russia despite pressures from the West. At the same time, Modi sought to avoid any rupture with the United States (US) and Europe on the Russian question.

This balancing act involved highlighting India’s political commitment to peace in Ukraine and focusing on the long neglected commercial ties with Russia. Contrary to the widespread expectations, New Delhi did not announce any new weapons purchases from Moscow but focused on expanding India’s access to the Russian market, improving connectivity and promoting manpower exports.

Explaining India’s nuanced position on Ukraine was a major priority for Modi. During his remarks with Putin besides him, Modi said, “India is not neutral. India has a side, and that side is of peace. We support all efforts for peace, and we stand shoulder-to-shoulder with all efforts for peace.” This diplomatic tightrope walking is also part of the awareness in New Delhi that easing of tensions between the US and Russia would reduce Moscow’s current dependence on Beijing and widen India’s room for geopolitical manueuvre.

The summit’s most concrete outcome was an ambitious economic cooperation programme to 2030. New Delhi and Moscow set a target of raising bilateral trade to US$100 billion (S$135 billion) by the end of the decade – up from around US$65 billion (S$87.8 billion) in 2024-25, fuelled largely by India’s purchases of discounted Russian oil amidst Western sanctions. These oil purchases have, however, created a massive trade deficit with Russia, since India exports only US$5 billion (S$6.75 billion) worth of tools to Russia. New Delhi has been eager to reduce the one-sided nature of trade by boosting Indian exports into a sanctions-hit Russian market.

The joint statement issued after the talks between Modi and Putin underlined the importance of “addressing tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, removing bottlenecks in logistics, promoting connectivity, ensuring smooth payment mechanisms, finding mutually acceptable solutions for issues of insurance and reinsurance and regular interaction between the businesses of the two countries are among the key elements for timely achievement” of a deeper trade partnership by 2030.

One new dimension of the economic partnership are agreements to facilitate the movement of Indian labour into Russia and prevent illegal immigration. This is similar to the migration and mobility agreements that India has signed with several Western partners and is likely to have significant impact over the long-term given the significant demographic challenges in Russia and the potential for economic reconstruction after the Ukraine war draws to a close.

Putin reaffirmed his country’s commitment to “uninterrupted” fuel supplies, implicitly assuring India that oil flows will continue despite Western pressure and tightening sanctions. India, on its part, has sought to downplay the oil trade issue, given the current sensitivities in the US and Europe. New Delhi chose to focus instead on the prospects for expanded cooperation on nuclear energy. Modi and Putin “noted the importance of the cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as a significant component of the strategic partnership taking into account the plans of the Government of India to increase India’s nuclear energy capacity to 100 GW by 2047.” This is likely to include acquisition of Russian nuclear reactors and the potential for collaboration in the production of small modular reactors, floating nuclear plants and non-power nuclear applications in medicine and agriculture.

Modi and Putin stressed the importance of connectivity and called for “building stable and efficient transport corridors, with the focus on expanding logistics links for improving connectivity and enhancing infrastructure capacity to support the International North-South Transport Corridor, the Chennai-Vladivostok (Eastern Maritime) Corridor and the Northern Sea Route.”

On defence, Modi and Putin focused on consolidating the traditional ties rather than new “big-ticket” announcements. The discussions between the two leaders put special emphasis on joint development, co-production and technology transfer across services with an eye to moving beyond a simple buyer-seller relationship.

Beyond defence, the agenda included cooperation in space, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence and critical minerals. There was a special emphasis on widening the traditional government-to-government engagement on science and technology to bring in the Indian private sector into the conversation.

If the economic agreements are implemented, both Russia and India will succeed in diversifying their economic engagement with the world. For Russia, there is an opportunity to engage deeper with the rapidly expanding Indian economy and develop markets beyond the traditional focus on China and Europe. For India, growing access to the Russian market will give greater depth to its export basket currently focused on the US and Europe. Connectivity projects could improve India’s physical integration with Eurasia and diversify supply chains.

Putin’s return to New Delhi confirms that the India-Russia partnership, though no longer the central axis of Indian foreign policy, remains a significant strand in India’s strategic calculus. The 2025 summit was about reimagining the Russian relationship with greater focus on trade and technology while preserving its traditional defence core.

. . . . .

Professor C Raja Mohan is a Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). He can be contacted at crmohan@nus.edu.sg. The author bears full responsibility for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper.

Pic Credit: X